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Abstract
Gilbert Ryle (1949) divided knowledge into “know that”
and “know how”, which is neatly appealing to many design
and technology educators, and like many writers on
developing the curriculum, Kahney (1993) made a
distinction between declarative knowledge: 
verbal knowledge, that is, the kind you get from books,
instructions and being told what to do.
and procedural knowledge:
In order to achieve skilled performance you need to be
able to translate declarative knowledge into actions. 
A new form of representation, known as procedural
knowledge must be established. (p.91)
However, a curriculum that consists simply of information
and techniques not only fails to reflect the original
intentions of the creators of the UK National Curriculum
for design and technology but also misses the mark in
terms of developing creative and inventive minds. 
Evidence from such fields as cognitive archaeology (e.g.
Renfrew, 1994) suggest that the symbiotic relationship
between mind and hand that typifies technological action
and innovation was a primary driver within human
evolution. Thus designing technology is one of the defining
characteristics of our species. Technology education,
therefore, should not be seen simply from an
instrumentalist viewpoint as a preparation for the world of
work but as a preparation for full functionality in human
society.
A tentative taxonomy of the features of conceptual learning
within technological action should, therefore, include those
features that define our humanity and our distinctiveness
from other species. These are identified as the ability to be
self-reflective, to play with ideas, to make analogical
connections between apparently disparate features and to
indulge in leaps of the imagination. The contention is that if
we fill up our curriculum with declarative and procedural
knowledge, without acknowledging and encouraging the
unique response or the innovative idea, then we will have
designed a curriculum that, however hard we try, will never
really succeed in “making it work” for many of our most
creative pupils.
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Introduction
This article is a snapshot of a moving target, which is in the
early stages of its trajectory. It documents a process of
personal boundary crossing that began during my doctoral
research into young children’s use of drawing for designing
and is currently developing into an exploration into human
cognition as revealed through our design capability. This
has included the literature on metaphor, analogy, humour
and other areas related to the way the human brain
functions but, currently, into human evolution and the pre-
history of the human mind in order to unpick the
characteristics and capabilities that underpin what it means
to be a creative, design-capable human being. 
From looking at research beyond the normal boundaries of
design and technology into the field of cognitive
archaeology and at the evolution of our species from tool-
making primates into designers of technology, conclusions
have been drawn on the kind of technological education
we should be providing. A curriculum that consists simply
of information and techniques about making things misses
the mark in terms of developing creative and inventive
minds. Technology education should not be seen simply
from an instrumentalist viewpoint as a preparation for the
world of work but as a preparation for full functionality in
human society. 
Thinking about Knowing and Doing
Archer (1986) asserted that the three “R’s” of education
were “reading, reckoning and wroughting” which represent
three modes of knowledge: narrative, paradigm and
“doing”; the Greek techne. The duality of mind and body in
Western thought, with its insistence that mind was more
important, has constantly devalued practical activity. Gilbert
Ryle (1949) divided knowledge into “know that” and
“know how”, which is neatly appealing to many design and
technology educators since the dualism of 
know how/know that can be extended and applied to
designing and making processes. There is more happening
within designing, however, that this simple dualism. The
strategy chosen to move the design forward depends on
seeing potential within a parallel, analogical system for
modelling a design solution (which may be a drawing, a
mock-up or a maquette) all of which stand in an analogical
relationship to the final, real, product (Figure. 1). 
The knowing that includes the recognition of both the
relationship and the relevance of a modelling technique as
well as the knowing how to do so.
Factual knowledge will not impact on a child’s (or adult’s)
approach to a practical design task unless they see its
relevance to the task. Children as young as five years old,
for instance, can draw what they want to make but some
of my research subjects asked “Why are we drawing this
twice?” (i.e. once on the paper and again on the card)
when they were making puppets. Egan (1999) also noted
that children did not understand the function of drawing in
the design process. Knowing the parameters of the task
and knowing how to draw their ideas was not enough. 
A key to the success of my own research in the classroom
was explaining to the children the purpose of design
drawing in a way that they could understand. This
explanation (extrapolated from Lakoff and Johnson, 1980)
was that design drawing is simultaneously a Container For
Ideas and a Journey Of Ideas across the page and off the
page into the prototype and/or product (Figure. 2, Hope,
2003). 
Enhancing children’s ability to model design solutions
through equipping them with the techniques to do so
would only be possible if they saw analogies between
their ideas, the model and the final product, and also
perceived the potential of making those analogies explicit.
The model (whether drawn, made or described) stands
for the image in the mind and the product that will exist in
the real world and can be discussed, examined and
evaluated as if it were the real thing. 
However, despite the success of the metaphor, I was
acutely aware that I had neatly side-stepped the central
issue of whether or not design drawing was a metaphor
by finding a metaphor for design drawing that produced
success in a classroom. I believed, but could not imagine
how it might be proven, that the human ability to see
analogies across domains and to see and reason “as if”
(Craft, 1997), “seeing as” (Wittgenstein, 1969), is close to
the heart of design capability. The ability to gain new
insights and build new concepts as metaphors or
analogies to the ones we already possess is parallel to the
capabilities that enable us to be designers.
The Contribution of Cognitive Archaeology
Paralleling the philosophy of Ryle, but with no reference to
him (and probably quite unaware of his contribution to
English-speaking epistemology) the French cognitive
archaeologist Pélégrin (1991) identified connaissance
(“knowledge with understanding”) and savoire-faire
(“know-how”) as the two main characteristics of stone
knapping hominid’s cognitive capabilities. Producing a
stone chopping tool, says Pélégrin (1991), required an
inner mental model of the final shape, an understanding
of the properties of stone and the know-how with which
to combine the two. Handling examples of such tools
from half a million years ago inspires a sense of
a) the analogy exists
b) it can be exploited
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Figure 1. Strategy Knowledge (Hope, 2000)
Figure 2. Container and Journey Metaphor of Design Drawing (Hope, 2003b)
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connectedness with the tool-makers who created these
beautiful tear-shaped symmetrical artefacts. Yet these tool-
makers were not us, homo sapiens, but pre-human
hominids, homo habilis. In fact, the first stone tools were
not created by hominid species at all but by pre-homo
primates, australopithecus, the younger cousins to ‘Lucy’
discovered by archaeologists in Ethiopia on which
Coppens comments:
This is the first appearance in our history of “one tool
made by another” for a clearly determined purpose.....
The crafted tool, modest as it may be, implies a form for
an idea, an organised and transferable project, an
elaborative communication.
Coppens (1985)
Thus, whatever it is to be fully human does not reside
within the technical competences of making things. 
Know-that and know-how are not enough to define our
technological capabilities. Among the distinguishing
characteristics that separate modern humans (homo
sapiens) from our closest living relatives the common and
pygmy chimpanzees (pan troglodytes and pan paniscus),
design capability comes high on the list. Evidence from
cognitive archaeology (e.g. Renfrew, 1994) suggests that
the symbiotic relationship between mind and hand that
typifies technological action was a primary driver within
human evolution, such that it divided those who became
us from the Rest, even within the hominid species. Thus
designing technology is one of the defining characteristics
of our species. 
The joined-up analogical thinking of which homo sapiens
are capable, transforms know-that/know-how into the most
powerful thinking strategy on the planet. It enabled us to
design technology. No other creature on earth does this.
Other creatures have technical fixes that enable them to
survive but no other creature actively and purposefully
designs the technology that they use in the way that
humans do. However much training various researchers
have devoted to pygmy chimpanzees, they do not make
metaphorical leaps between domains of knowledge
(Mitchell, 1997). 
Mithen (1996) claimed that a cognitive re-shuffle
happened at the birth of homo sapiens. Whereas other
previous and contemporaneous homo species (including
the Neanderthals) were knowledgeable about their
environment, had well-developed social skills and tool-
making capacities, there were limited connections
between their separate spheres of thought. When the
Great Leap Forward of metaphorical thinking occurred
(somewhere between 100,000 and 40,000 years ago),
then creativity is evident in the sudden flowering of tool
types, decoration, statuary and art. 
Remains of Neolithic culture in Britain and Europe,
illustrates the contrast between the thinking and acting of
homo sapiens and earlier homo species. Stonehenge is
one of the best known of the megalithic monuments
created in the more recent pre-historic past. Pitt (2001)
claimed that its construction combined the stone-working
techniques in which these people were undoubtedly
expert with the structural form of earlier wooden circular
monuments such as Woodhenge. Pitt goes as far as to
claim that the underground parts of the sarsen stones (the
massive outer circle that support lintels to make the horse
shoe shape of Stonehenge) give evidence of having been
worked as if they were giant flints, by flaking off large
shards, as would come naturally to expert Neolithic stone-
workers. The tops of the sarsens, meanwhile, show
mortise and tenon joints associated with woodworking
techniques. Further, he claims that each pair of lintel-
supporting sarsens consists of one well worked, smooth
stone (representing timber?) and one rough, more natural
stone, as if the builders were consciously playing with the
wood/stone relationship.
Even if Pitt is wrong, the plausibility of his argument
connects us to the thinking of these people. The way in
which Medieval master masons incorporated religious
messages in the design and layout of cathedrals and
churches across Europe gives us a feel for the way in
which Stonehenge’s constructors might have played with
the meanings and metaphors in the construction of their
great religious monument. It matters not that we cannot
know what these were, we can put ourselves into their
mind frame. Incorporating religious, social and cultural
symbolism into products and structures is a uniquely
human affair. Our Neolithic ancestors had technology, in
all its social, cultural and economic dimensions, not just
techniques (Hope, 2008).
Design and Cognition
The following list, a sort of tentative taxonomy, of generic
human capacities that underlie design capability is not
exhaustive and is certainly not in any particular order.
These are areas that need to be explored and examined in
greater depth, suggesting other boundaries to cross in
order to understand the nature of human design
capability. The evidence from cognitive archaeology cited
above seems to indicate that the ability to design is close
to the core of what it is to be human. The examples from
children designing that are used to illustrate some of these
capacities come from my research into children’s design
drawing, simply because they were readily to hand. Other
forms of modelling (discussion, mock-ups, maquettes, and
so on) satisfy the criteria equally well.
• Agency and conation
Subsumed under the term ‘agency’ are concepts such as
sentience, self-awareness and evaluative capabilities and
all the other relatives of meta-cognition. The ability to
classify and reflect on the success of one’s own and
other peoples’ thoughts, ideas and designs depends on
the awareness of one’s self as an agent who can plan,
decide and effect changes in the environment, whether
physical, social or cognitive. This is unique to humans
and has led, among other things, to the ability to take the
perspective of another and design something that will be
useful for someone else, even if we have no need of the
artefact. It enables us to evaluate existing products or
possible design solutions which we will never use
ourselves.
Atman (1992) used the word ‘conation’ to imply an “I
can do”, empowerment and action, for which a sense of
agency is primary. ‘Enaction’ is a similarly related term,
utilised by Khatchatourov et al.:
… all technical artefacts, from stone tools to cars to
computers, are "enactive interfaces" that mediate the
structural coupling between human beings and the world
they live in, and hence bring forth a particular world of
lived experience
(Khatchatourov et al. 2008)
In Example 1, Craig, aged seven years, has drawn a
pencil alongside his design idea. “That’s me drawing” he
explained, in assertion of agency and self-reference. 
Example 1.“That’s me drawing!”
Tomasello (1999) claimed that awareness of one’s own
agency leads to a theory of mind that perceives others
as having similar minds. Deliberate teaching and
attentive learning spring from the assumption of
intentionality: that what is be demonstrated is intended
to be imitated. Not only are both teacher and learner
agents within the transmission of knowledge from
teacher to learner, but the assumption of the learner’s
agency by the teacher means that the teacher relies on
the learner’s ability internalise the learning and to apply
it across a range of new situations. Young chimps copy
older chimps cracking nuts with stones but they do not
take that knowledge and apply it to new and novel
situations nor do they seek out or create new
opportunities for applying that knowledge. We live in
hope that our learners will take what we teach them
into new and innovative areas of exploration and
discovery.
• Symbolism
Part of the limitation on chimps’ cognitive development is,
of course, linguistic. Language, both spoken and written is
the uniquely human symbolic reference system that
enables us to think, imagine and design: “Man is a
symbolic animal” (Fèvre, 2004). This symbolic capability
enables us to make sense of the world through the
creation of narrative and to communicate our ideas to
others.
Drawings, prototypes and models also serve a symbolic
function. Example 2 not only shows seven year old Maria’s
use of numerical standardised measuring units, but also
her ability to use a diagram that records just the relevant
part of the drawing for her purpose. She does not need to
re-draw the whole travel bag that she is designing for a toy
teddy, just the two sides to remind herself of the
dimensions.
Example 2: Numerical Symbolism
The vital role of language in design was demonstrated in
the development of one child, Andy, whose design
capability I tracked for five years (Hope, 2007). He was on
the Special Educational Needs Register from first entry into
school at age four years and identified as having some form
of language development delay. When he was six he
produced a most impressive drawing of a rocking chair as
seen from the back and drew a picture of the house he
would like to make for a story character which he followed
Craig
Maria
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quite faithfully in the making. However, despite this
apparent early prowess, by age eight he had been
overtaken by his peers and by age nine, when they could
use drawing quite effectively to generate and develop
design ideas, he was producing one simple line drawing
without any labelling that communicated little information
about what he intended to make. He was not an isolated
case. I frequently observed that children with linguistic
impairments struggled to design and make a product that
was comparable to that of their peers either in terms of
creativity of response or in satisfying the design brief.
Language, it would seem, is an essential requirement to
design.
• Systems
Human technological activity involves awareness of the
teleology of the design task and the systematic
forethought and planning of the processes and techniques
needed to bring it into being, including gathering together
all the required materials and, possibly, involving others in
the plan. Integral to this are both analysis and synthesis,
the ability to mentally take things apart and re-construct
something new.
During one lesson, Maria and I conducted a conversation
at cross-purposes because I thought each sketch on her
paper represented a different idea. Later, I saw she had
added connecting lines and I understood that she wanted
me to know that she had been using drawing to think
through the process of making the product.
Example 3: Maria’s Easter Egg Holder
Being systematic is more than just about being organised or
being able to plan what you want to do. It is also inherent in
the ability to reflect and evaluate and to compare the
evolving product to the idea in the mind’s eye. It infers an
ability to have in the mind an evolving model of what the
product might look like at various stages of production, even
when these are spread out across several working sessions
that might be a week or more apart. It implies, therefore,
the ability to pick up the thread where we left off and know
where we were in the process and be able to continue it to
the same conclusion that we originally intended.
• Paracosm
A paracosm is a complete, internally logical, fantasy
world: those completely imaginary worlds that people
create within their heads for their own entertainment,
especially when bored or needing some time out from
the real world. The ability to create and understand the
world as stories and metaphors (“Contes et Metaphores”
Fèvre, 2004) underpins the creation of the design
narrative, and is first cousin to the dialogue between the
inner and outer reality that Winnicott (1971) identified
within play. This ability to reason, imagine and think
within a complete created system, the author’s skill, is
also the designer’s skill.
Paracosm as a form of internalised linguistic play has its
origins in the role-playing of young children and which,
like play, conforms to a consistent internal logic. They
may push to the brink the boundaries between the
possible and the impossible, but paracosms do not
break their own rules. For instance, however crazy the
story might seem to others, the idea of an island
populated by tiny people, on which a normal sized man
is shipwrecked, then falls asleep and wakes up to find
himself tied down by hundreds of tiny threads, has its
own internal logic. The contradictions were ironed out in
Defoe’s head as he created the tale, just as the creators
of Star Trek struggle to devise solutions to space flight
problems that do not contradict the laws of physics, to
the extent of even consulting Stephen Hawkings as an
advisor. 
In the same way, great breakthroughs in science or
technological innovation spring from the human ability to
create and reason within a semi-closed logic system,
whilst also allowing analogies from completely different,
sometimes even contradictory, fields to permeate the
boundaries and fuel the on-going creation. This
paracosmic capacity is, I believe, fundamental to design,
creativity and invention. Designing requires the ability to
create paracosms, to think and reason and create
possibilities within a narrative context that has its own
internal logic and that obeys the laws of the system as
created. 
• Rationality
Our rational faculties enable us to see what will work and
what will not, whether by deduction or induction (of
which extrapolation is the extension towards analogy and
metaphor). We compare what we see to what we know
from past experience and can judge whether or not the
idea holds an internal logic. This faculty develops with
age. For instance, adults see the joke within Heath
Robinson’s Professor Branestawm inventions whereas
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small children just stare at them without perceiving the
illogical and impossible. 
The age at which children’s humour develops to the point
where they start to tell linguistic jokes (about age 6-7) is
also, interestingly, the age at which they can begin to use
drawing effectively for designing. However much Piaget’s
experimental technique has been maligned for its validity
(for example, Donaldson, 1979), he did appear to have
come to valid overall conclusions. There is a shift in the way
in which children reason about the world around this age. I
think this is linked to rise of the rational, the understanding
of the rule-bound nature of the external universe. The flip-
side, the apparent decrease in creativity, is the evidence of
struggling with the rules and learning which rules can be
bent and which cannot. 
There is a perennial concern that children appear to become
less creative in the middle years of childhood and that
somehow schooling has robbed them of that essential spark
that was so obvious a characteristic of the pre-school years. I
would like to suggest an alternative explanation. Young
children’s ideas are original but they are divergent, which is
different from creative. Their ideas rarely work in the real
world sense of the word. Their ideas are fluid and they are
willing to pretend all the bits that don’t fit the rules of the
game or task. This creates a dilemma when teacher is
setting the task. For instance: when asked to choose which
material to use to make a waterproof hat, which aspect of
the task do you pretend? That you like black bin liners or that
red tissue paper is waterproof? Red tissue paper is the clear
winner until you have learnt the right set of game rules.
• Creativity
Koestler (1974) began his book “The Act of Creation” with
a consideration of humour. In his view, the ability to see
the mis-match between two things as funny is
fundamental to creativity. His term “bisociation” includes
analogy, metaphors, trophes and other linguistic and poetic
devices, as well as design. Paralleling Lakoff and Johnson’s
“Metaphors We Live By” (1980), Fèvres (2004) in “Contes
et Métaphores” (Tales and Metaphors) claims that all social
knowledge is built through narrative. However, I would
contend these  conclusions as much as Bruner’s (1962)
belief that there was no possibility for dialogue between
the paradigmatic (mathematical and scientific) ways of
thinking and narrative ways. I think that true creativity
comes through the bisociation of the rational and the
divergent. It is the application of reason to possibility that
turns divergency into creativity, the crazy idea into a
plausible design. 
Some of the children’s work that I examined in my
research forced me to question whether a solution is
creative if it is beyond the constraints of the design brief
(Hope, 2004, 2007). My current thinking is that a
successful design solution must also follow from the
rational as well as the narrative. One girl, Zara, was so good
at narrative that she even constructed “Episode 2” for one
of my design tasks (Hope, 2004) rather than satisfy the
design brief. It was not, therefore, a creative design solution
to the question she was asked to address. Leaps of the
imagination are fine, as long as they land somewhere
within the zone of possible answers (Middleton’s (2000)
“satisficing zone”). Playing with ideas only moves on to
being a design solution if the answer conforms to the
internal logic of the design question; if it lands within the
paracosmic space.
In Summary
Engagement with the cognitive archaeology literature has,
for me, shed light on the nature of design capability and
prompted questions about what kind of design and
technology education should be provided for our children.
An instrumentalist, vocational view of the subject, simply
equipping young people with skills and techniques for the
world of work, does not challenge and extend their core
human capabilities. Too often, children in schools seem to
be doing a series of structured practical tasks in which they
learn a series of techniques rather than being given a
design assignment in which they can make real choices
and make real connections with other things they know
and care about. What I have tried to do in this article is to
begin to unpick why design and technology education
should be going beyond the “how to make it work”
approach in which all the real decision-making is done by
the teacher. 
From my reading of the cognitive archaeology literature, it
appears that the now extinct pre-human hominids had
know-that and know-how aplenty. They knew when the
herds of antelope or reindeer would pass by their cave
and they knew how to make spears and choppers and
fire. They passed on this knowledge of facts and
techniques from generation to generation and yet they
went extinct. It seems that one factor may have been
rapid climate change. They could not adapt fast enough or
radically enough when huge temperature swings
happened within a generation. So, given what might be
coming soon, we need to do something in the education
of young homo sapiens in the interests of the future of
our species’ survival on our planet and that equipping
children with practical design capabilities is probably one
of the most essential components of their education.
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